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This Article analyzes the concept of “national referendum” and the 
relationship between representatives and citizens in Japan.  In Japan, 
there is no provision for a referendum on a national level except by a 
constitutional amendment and a special statute in national parliament, 
which applies only at the local public entity level.  Unlike at the national 
level, the Japanese Constitution allows local governments to have a 
referendum and recall system.  For example, in Okinawa Prefecture, 
where a United States’ (U.S.) base is located, the local government held 
a referendum that asked whether voters wanted the U.S. base to stay or 
relocate.  This referendum constituted a review of the Japan-U.S. Status 
of Forces Agreement. 
As Japanese constitutional studies have explained, a national 
referendum on specific issues is permissible only if it does not possess 
binding power.  First, the Japanese Constitution declares that only 
parliament, known as the Diet, possesses law-making power.  Thus, 
representatives may abuse the outcome of a national referendum by 
claiming they are acting in the name of the people through plebiscite.  
Additionally, the Japanese Constitution does not contain a provision 
that permits a recall system to discharge parliamentary representatives.  
Such representatives work for all Japanese people and do not depend 
on voters in their electoral districts. 
The Japanese Constitution is founded on the notion of popular 
sovereignty.  Popular sovereignty is a concept derived from the French 
Constitutions of 1791 and 1793.  The French Constitution of 1791 
established popular sovereignty, which is the principle that political 
power lies with the people and government derives its authority from 
the people’s consent through their elected representatives.  
2
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol50/iss2/5
NATIONAL REFERENDUM AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN JAPAN YUICHIRO TSUJI 
2020] NATIONAL REFERENDUM AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN JAPAN 419 
Significantly, the French Constitution of 1793 emphasized the power of 
the voters in a government founded on popular sovereignty.  Guided by 
this historical principle, once representatives are chosen, they work for 
all of the people, independent of the will of their electoral district. 
If a national referendum is allowed, the Japanese people may 
question the continued existence of popular sovereignty, wherein, the 
people, decide their destiny and take responsibility for their choices.  In 
reality, however, ordinary people do not consider politics an integral 
part of their daily lives.  Nowadays, a strong ruling party makes the 
important decisions without deliberation.  In Japan, democracy is in 
crisis.  Theoretically, the Japanese Constitution is set up so that 
parliament reflects the will of the people.  Japanese constitutional 
scholars have proposed semi representative and sociological 
representative systems to connect politics with citizens.  Both forms of 
representation overlap and should aim to reflect the will of the people 
to the parliament.  Under the semi representative system, the 
representatives’ will should match that of the people.  Under the 
sociological representative system, the representatives are legitimized 
through elections and the people should be empowered to choose a 
political party that reflects their beliefs through partisan distribution in 
the parliament. 
 In the 1970s, scholar Yasuo Sugihara analyzed the notion of 
“people” under popular sovereignty and addressed the gap between the 
will of the people and that of their representatives.  He argued that the 
concept of sovereignty may work as a political ideology under popular 
sovereignty in the Japanese Constitution.  Sugihara’s analysis has 
helped ordinary people realize that they hold political power and that 
politics should be an integral part of their daily lives.  As a prominent 
French constitutional scholar in Japan, Professor Yōichi Higuchi, 
however, continues to doubt the reality of direct democracy. 
I. NATIONAL REFERENDUMS UNDER THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 
This Article reviews the possibility and theory of the national 
referendum under the Japanese Constitution.  Under globalization, the 
internationalization of nations restricts the sovereign state’s 
discretionary power: the government’s ability to make decisions for 
3
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itself.1  Similarly, the narrowed scope of national authority limits what 
“we the people” can decide today.  We can no longer make decisions 
for our future like we used to.  Under the Japanese Constitution, 
sovereignty resides with the power and authority of the people.2  
Authority refers to democratic legitimacy and power derives from the 
voters who choose their representatives in parliament, the National 
Diet.3  The Emperor has no power or authority; his power is limited to 
a ceremonial and symbolic role.4 
A.  Limited Sovereignty and the Representatives’ Relationship with 
“We the People” 
Article 43 of the Japanese Constitution states that the 
representatives are expected to work for all of the people.5  This means 
that representatives should be independent from the will of the voters 
in electoral districts.  Once electoral districts vote on their 
representatives, those representatives become members of parliament 
and should reflect the integrated will of all of the people.6  The Japanese 
Constitution’s Preamble indicates that it implements indirect 
democracy but with a few provisions for a direct voting system, namely 
 
1. See NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 39-43 (6th ed. 2015) 
(Japan). This book is one of the most famous books on the Japanese 
constitution. Nobuyoshi Ashibe, a professor at The University of Tokyo, is 
specialized in American constitutional law. See Lawyer Group Charges Abe with 
Constitutional Ignorance, JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 14, 2014), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/02/14/national/lawyer-group-charges-abe-
with-constitutional-ignorance/#.XlsZxy2ZM0p. See also TOSHIHIKO NONAKA ET AL., 
KENPŌ I [CONSTITUTION I] 90-94 (Yuhikaku 2012) (Japan) [hereinafter NONAKA ET 
AL., KENPŌ I]; HIDEKI MOTO ET AL., KENPŌ KŌGI [LECTURE OF CONSTITUTION] 
(Nihon Hyoronsha 2018) [hereinafter MOTO, KENPŌ]. 
2. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], pmbl. (Japan); ASHIBE, supra 
note 1, at 41. See SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL 
ANALYSIS 38-41 (2011). 
3. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], pmbl., art. 43 (Japan). See 
ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 39; MATSUI, supra note 2, at 38-41. 
4. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 1 (Japan). 
5. Id. art. 43 (Japan); TOSHIHIKO NONAKA ET AL., KENPŌ II [CONSTITUTION II] 
59-64 (Yuhikaku 2012) (Japan) [hereinafter NONAKA ET AL., KENPŌ II]. 
6. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 43 (Japan).   
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a constitutional amendment,7 “[a] special law, applicable only to one 
local public entity,”8 and a judge’s referendum.9 
The current Constitution was promulgated in November 1946 and 
has never been amended.10  The Constitution of the Japanese Empire 
(Meiji Constitution) was replaced with the current Japanese 
Constitution, which transferred power from the emperor to the people.11  
To understand this change in the view of sovereignty, consider an 
American constitutional law scholar Professor Nobuyoshi Ashibe’s 
explanation that constituent power lies outside of the Constitution and 
differs from the power to amend the Constitution.12  The power to 
amend the Constitution is an institutionalized constituent power.13  
Professor Ashibe argues it is impossible to amend the Constitution’s 
designation of sovereignty and its provisions on human rights and 
peace.14  Under the current Constitution, Japanese people reserve the 
power to make constitutional amendments, but they have never 
 
7. See id. pmbl., art. 96. “Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by 
the Diet, . . . and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, . . . at a 
special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify.” Id. art. 96. 
8. Id. art. 95 (“A special law, applicable only to one local public entity, cannot 
be enacted by the Diet without the consent of the majority of the voters of the local 
public entity concerned, obtained in accordance with law.”).  
9. Id. art. 79(2) (“The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be 
reviewed by the people at the first general election of members of the House of 
Representatives following their appointment, and shall be reviewed again at the first 
general election of members of the House of Representatives after a lapse of ten (10) 
years, and in the same manner thereafter.”). 
10. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan); Adam P. Liff & Ko 
Maeda, Why Shinzo Abe Faces an Uphill Battle to Revise Japan’s Constitution, 
BROOKINGS: ORDER FROM CHAOS (Dec. 15, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/15/why-shinzo-abe-
faces-an-uphill-battle-to-revise-japans-constitution/. 
11. Compare DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPŌ [MEIJI KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 
1 (Japan), with NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 1 (Japan).  
12. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 42-43, 396-98 (Ashibe explains that the power to 
amend the Constitution originates from constituents’ power. The power to amend the 
Constitution cannot be used to take away the people’s sovereignty or their 
fundamental human rights). See MATSUI, supra note 2, at 38-41. 
13. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 42. 
14. Id. at 396; NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 9, 10-40 
(Japan) (Article 9 is the peace clause and Articles 10-40 are the provisions about the 
people’s human rights.). 
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exercised that power.  The National Diet consists of two houses: the 
House of Representatives and the House of Councillors.15  Ordinarily, 
politics is left in the hands of the representatives in both houses. 
To understand Japanese sovereignty and the relationship between 
the people and the representatives, it is necessary to consider how 
Japanese constitutional studies reflect French constitutional studies.  
Ashibe explains that in the Japanese Constitution, the term authority 
refers to national sovereignty established by the French Constitution 
of 1791, whereas the term power refers to people sovereignty 
established by the French Constitution of 1793.16  Ashibe’s discussion 
focuses on Yasuo Sugihara and Yōichi Higuchi’s views on sovereignty.  
Sugihara’s work examines Raymond Carre´ de Malberg’s theory, 
which positioned the Constitutions of 1791 and 1793 as rivals.17  On 
the other hand, Higuchi examines Georges Burdeau’s and other French 
constitutional scholars’ work.18 
Japanese constitutional studies have been influenced by U.S., 
French, and German constitutional studies.  Professor Yōichi Higuchi 
argues that the people originally had the constituent power to establish 
the current Constitution when it was instituted.19  Once the provisions 
were fixed into the constitution, the constituent power froze, and it 
reactivates only on a few rare occasions, such as when the people make 
an amendment.20  French constitutional scholars in Japan argue that the 
 
15. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 42 (Japan).  
16. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 40-43; Yasuo Hasebe, Constitutional Borrowing 
and Political Theory, 1 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 224, 228, 230. 
17. See Hasebe, supra note 16, at 226-27, 227 n.4. See generally Olga Bashinka, 
Raymond Carré de Malberg and the Interpretation of Sovereignty in the Belgian 
Constitution, 35 J. OF CONST. HISTORY 149 (2018) (discussing Carré de Malberg’s 
theory on sovereignty and views on referendums). 
18. MIYOKO TSUJIMURA, FRANSU KENPŌ TO GENDAI RIKKENSHUGI NO 
CHŌSEN [THE FRENCH CONSTITUTION AND THE CHALLENGE OF MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM] 163-67 (2010) (addressing Higuchi and Sugihara’s views and 
noting that their views are less conflicting than they appear).  
19. YŌICHI HIGUCHI, KINDAI RIKKENSHUGI TO GENDAI KOKKA [MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND NATION] 302 (Keiso Shobo 1973) [hereinafter HIGUCHI, 
KINDAI RIKKENSHUGI].  
20. Id. at 302-04; see also YASUO SUGIHARA, KOKUMIN-SHUKEN TO KOKUMIN-
DAIHYO-SEI [THE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY PRINCIPLE AND REPRESENTATIVE 
REGIMES] 319-326 (Yuhikaku 1983) [hereinafter SUGIHARA, KOKUMIN-SHUKEN] 
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dichotomy of Professor Raymond Carre´ de Malberg is too simplistic, 
but they admit that de Malberg’s distinction has helped understand how 
the Japanese Constitution first reflected the French Constitution of 1791 
and then of 1793.21  For example, one of the leading French 
constitutional scholars in Japan, Miyoko Tsujmira, explains that the 
battle between Higuchi and Sugihara in the 1970s epitomizes academic 
research on sovereignty.22 
Japanese constitutional studies reveal that the Japanese 
Constitution considers authority to be more important than power, but 
the representatives shall reflect the people’s diverse perspectives.23  The 
idea of having both semi representatives24 and sociological 
representatives25 has been developed to connect people with politics.  
The role of semi representatives is to convey the will of the voters to 
the people’s representatives in parliament.26  Sociological 
representatives, however, are selected by voters through partisan 
elections.27  Japanese constitutional studies are now studying how to 
practice democracy by utilizing semi and sociological representatives.  
However, Japanese constitutional studies face certain issues: how to 
assure that the people’s voice reaches parliament, particularly when that 
voice is difficult to define and assess, and how to allocate the 
parliamentary seats to adequately reflect the people’s vote.28 
 
(summarizing Higuchi’s argument and explaining Sugihara’s disagreements); 
MATSUI, supra note 2, at 39. 
21. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 43 (discussing the contrast between the French 
Constitution of 1791 and of 1793). 
22. See TSUJIMURA, supra note 18, at 163-170. 
23. NONAKA ET AL., KENPŌ I, supra note 1, at 36-41. 
24. NONAKA ET AL., KENPŌ II, supra note 5, at 59-63; see also YŌICHI HIGUCHI, 
HIKAKU KENPŌ [COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTION] 475 (1992) (Japan) (explaining that 
Adhémar Esmein defines semi representative as requiring parliament to reflect the 
people’s will); YASUO SUGIHARA, KENPŌ I [CONSTITUTION I] 147-50 (Yuhikaku 
1987) (Japan) [hereinafter SUGIHARA, KENPŌ I].  
25. NONAKA ET AL., KENPŌ II, supra note 5, at 60-61. 
26. HIGUCHI, HIKAKU KENPŌ, supra note 24, at 474-75. 
27. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 68, 153-54.  
28. HIGUCHI, HIKAKU KENPŌ, supra note 24, at 475. 
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B. How to Understand Sovereignty in Japan 
Sovereignty changed from the Emperor to “we the people” under 
the current Constitution. Additional research is needed to explain how 
a constitutional amendment could change the nature of sovereignty.  
Nonetheless, a review of renowned academic discussions regarding 
sovereignty in Japanese constitutional studies illustrates how Japanese 
scholars have incorporated the French constitution into the Japanese 
model. 
Professor Higuchi contends that people’s sovereignty is the 
constituent power, and it serves as the basis of legitimacy for 
government.29  Historically, citizens resisted the monarchy through 
revolutions.  The French Constitution of 1791 differentiated between 
revising the entire constitution and partially amending it.30  Although 
the French Constitution of 1791 provided for complete revision as a 
theoretical possibility, it provided a method for only partially amending 
the Constitution.31  In general, the express inclusion of people’s 
sovereignty and constituent power into a constitution provides 
legitimacy for a government.  Professor Higuchi fears that the Japanese 
government has abused its legitimacy in justifying majoritarian 
decisions by claiming it acts in the name of people’s sovereignty, which 
destroys the rule of law.32  Higuchi emphasizes the importance of 
human rights and opposes the arbitrary exercise of governmental 
power.33  He argues that people’s sovereignty should comprise the basis 
of legitimacy.34 
In contrast, Professor Sugihara believes that people’s sovereignty 
means governmental power itself, noting that the people have actual 
power to govern themselves.35  Although Professor Higuchi believes 
sovereignty is constituent power itself, Professor Sugihara places 
constituent power outside the scope of sovereignty.  In Professor 
 
29. HIGUCHI, KINDAI RIKKENSHUGI, supra note 19, at 301-02; see also MATSUI, 
supra note 2, at 39. 
30. HIGUCHI, KINDAI RIKKENSHUGI, supra note 19, at 301. 
31. Id.  
32. Id. at 296-97; see also SUGIHARA, KOKUMIN-SHUKEN, supra note 20, at 324.  
33. HIGUCHI, KINDAI RIKKENSHUGI, supra note 19, at 296-97. 
34. SUGIHARA, KOKUMIN-SHUKEN, supra note 20, at 324-25. 
35. Id. at 325-36; MATSUI, supra note 2, at 39. 
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Sugihara’s opinion, sovereignty is a legal principle to explain 
attribution, to whom sovereignty belongs; people, as the collective will 
of a nation, should be central to final decision making.36  Sugihara 
argues that power should be democratized because otherwise, human 
rights may be violated.37  In Japan, a dramatic and rapid change among 
social classes has shifted focus from the nation to the people’s 
constitution.38 
In examining the change from the previous constitution to the 
current Constitution, both Professor Higuchi and Professor Sugihara’s 
arguments represent a conflicting understanding of sovereignty and 
how constituent power relates to it.  Today, however, their arguments 
may not seem incongruous because they share similar concerns, such 
as how majoritarian decision making violates human dignity.39  
Professor Nobuyoshi Ashibe is concerned that constituent power is 
unlimited power and is left in the hands of the ruling administration.40 
C. A National Referendum’s Binding Power 
Although it may be impossible to assess whether the Constitution 
precisely reflects the will of the people, examining the voting rate may 
shed some light.  Japanese constitutional scholars worry that most 
people are indifferent to national politics.41  Accordingly, a national 
referendum may seem like a better alternative because it calls for the 
people’s direct participation on a political issue.  The Japanese 
Constitution, however, does not contain a provision that allows a 
national referendum except for a few provisions in special situations: 
 
36. YASUO SUGIHARA, KENPŌ II [CONSTITUTION II] 176 (Yuhikaku 1989) 
[hereinafter SUGIHARA, KENPŌ II]; see also TSUJIMURA, supra note 18, at 164-66. 
37. SUGIHARA, KOKUMIN-SHUKEN, supra note 20, at 334-36.  
38. SUGIHARA, KENPŌ I, supra note 24, at 147-63. 
39. TSUJIMURA, supra note 18, at 168 (discussing Sugihara and Higuchi’s views 
and how Ashibe’s argument incorporates both).  
40. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 396-97 (arguing there should be limits on 
constitutional amendments).  
41. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 147-48 (discussing the difficulty of defining 
the people’s will and evaluating election results in a manner that allows it to be 
sufficiently reflected in the parliament).  
9
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deciding on a constitutional amendment42 and “a special law, applicable 
only to one local public entity.”43 
In Japan, one of the famous academic discussions considers 
whether the current Constitution allows for a national referendum with 
binding power.44  Generally, a national referendum with binding power 
is not allowed because it conflicts with sovereignty and the Japanese 
Constitution does not express any procedure for conducting it.45  Under 
the current framework, representatives serve in the parliament, the 
Diet.46  Article 41 of the Japanese Constitution provides that law-
making powers belong solely to the Diet.47  A national referendum with 
binding power would contradict Article 41.  However, as mentioned 
above, the Constitution expressly provides some exceptions, such as a 
constitutional amendment. 
Professor Hideki Moto is wary of utilizing a national referendum 
for a specific issue because it may be used as an excuse to justify 
enacting one of the ruling party’s policies.48  Moto’s concern is that the 
outcome of a national referendum can be easily abused because of the 
people’s indifference to national politics.  Similarly, Professor Kosuke 
Fukui argues that in a parliamentary system, political elites often use 
national referendums to advance their own will.49 
One of the current problems Japanese constitutional scholars are 
concerned with is that the people’s indifference to politics has led 
representatives to neglect the will of the voters.  Currently, political 
parties do not function well enough to identify dynamic conflicts among 
the people.  Even if not legally binding, a national referendum is more 
likely to be used to justify an unconstitutional motive of the cabinet.  
 
42. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 96 (Japan). 
43. Id. art. 95. 
44. NONAKA ET AL., KENPŌ II, supra note 5, at 10-14 (arguing that a recall 
system for representatives is not possible under the Japanese Constitution merely 
because of what representatives say during discussions in the parliament). 
45. Some scholars believe a national referendum is possible. Toyoji Kakudo, 
Chokusetu Minshusei [Direct Democracy], in NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, HŌRITSU GAKUNO 
KISO CHISHIKI [BASIC OF LAW STUDIES] 9 (1969). 
46. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], ch. IV (Japan). 
47. Id. art. 41; see MATSUI, supra note 2, at 66. 
48. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 149. 
49. KOSUKE FUKUI, KOKUMIN TOHYŌSEI [NATIONAL REFERENDUM] 225-26 
(2007). 
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Even if the Japanese people are not allowed to hold a national 
referendum with legal binding power, they should be given an 
opportunity to review negotiations or agreements between the 
representatives to determine whether the political parties involved 
deserve their trust.  As the United Kingdom’s (UK) “Brexit” has 
proven, constitutional scholars should be vigilant because there is a 
mismatch between the voice of the voters and the majority in the 
parliament.50  Political indifference is a serious issue, which 
necessitates revitalizing public deliberation to encourage a more active 
discussion in the Diet.51  
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RECALL SYSTEM  
AT THE CENTRAL AND LOCAL LEVEL 
The current Japanese Constitution applies indirect democracy; it 
implements direct democracy only on a few exceptional occasions.  
Since representatives work for all Japanese people, once elections are 
over, voters cannot recall their politicians.52  Unlike central politics in 
Tokyo, the Governor and representatives in local parliaments face a 
recall system under the Local Government Act.53  The difference 
between the central and local governments helps explain the 
relationship between Japanese voters and their representatives. 
A. Ability of Japanese Living Abroad  
to Engage in the Judge Recall System 
Five types of courts make up the Japanese judicial system: (1) the 
Supreme Court, (2) High Courts, (3) District Courts, (4) Family Courts, 
 
50. See generally Ian McEwan, Brexit, The Most Pointless, Masochistic 
Ambition in Our Country’s History, Is Done, GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2020, 1:00AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/feb/01/brexit-pointless-masochistic-
ambition-history-done (discussing how the Brexit referendum played out). 
51. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 149 (arguing that if a national referendum 
is to be carried out, sufficient information should be provided to the public). 
52. See SUGIHARA, KENPŌ I, supra note 24, at 144 (noting one of the 
characteristics of a pure representative system is that if we understand the elected 
legislature as the sole decision maker and emphasize national sovereignty, then the 
other system of direct democracy—popular sovereignty—is excluded).  
53. Chihō Jichi Hō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, arts. 74-88 
(Japan). 
11
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and (5) Summary Courts.54  The Supreme Court is the highest judicial 
body in the Japanese system; it is comprised of fifteen justices, one of 
which serves as the Chief Justice.55  The only public officials that the 
people are allowed to reevaluate are these fifteen Supreme Court 
justices; the review process occurs during the first general election of 
the members of the House of Representatives following the justices’ 
appointments and every ten years thereafter.56  This exception allows 
the public to recall judges. 
Representatives, like judges, are public servants,57 and a similar 
review process should be afforded to Japanese people to reevaluate their 
representatives.  As the Japanese Constitution states, Japanese people 
“have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss 
them.”58  However, the Japanese Constitution does not provide specific 
procedural directions.  Thus, the legislature’s drafting of laws has 
sometimes failed to serve the public.  For example, in May 2019, the 
Tokyo District Court held that the legislature infringed the 
constitutional rights of Japanese citizens living outside of Japan by 
denying their ability to participate in reviewing the performance of 
Supreme Court Justices.59  Japanese citizens living abroad sued the 
 
54. Saibansho Hō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 6, 15, 23, 31-2, 32 
(Japan). 
55. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 6(2) (Japan); Supreme 
Court of Japan, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Supreme-Court-of-Japan (last visited Mar. 2, 
2020). In general, the people do not play any role in the selection of judges. Judges in 
inferior courts are “appointed by the Cabinet from a list of persons nominated by the 
Supreme Court.” NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 80 (Japan). The 
Cabinet appoints all judges except the Chief Justice. Id. art. 79. The Emperor appoints 
the Chief Justice. Id. art. 6(2). Only the fifteen Justices that make up the Supreme 
Court are reviewed under a national examination. Id. art. 79(2).  
56. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 79 (Japan). 
57. Id. art. 15(2).  
58. Id. Sugihara believes the Constitution demands direct democracy (a recall 
system) for all public officials based on Article 15(2). Moreover, Article 15, 
paragraph 1, requires that the people have a system for pursuing political 
responsibility. SUGIHARA, KENPŌ II, supra note 36, at 168. See MATSUI, supra note 
2, at 41. 
59. Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 28, 2019, Heisei 30 (gyo wa) 
no. 143, Heisei 30 (wa) no. 11936, Lex/DB no. 25570333.  
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government60 under the State Redress Act, which allows plaintiffs to 
recover damages caused by illegal government action.61  The plaintiffs 
argued that Japanese living abroad could not exercise their 
constitutional rights to review Supreme Court Justices.62  The plaintiffs 
were registered voters; however, they could not review justices 
“because they were living abroad and were not sent ballots.”63  The 
Tokyo District Court held that Japanese people share equal voting 
power, but it may be restricted for unavoidable reasons.64 
Previously, in 2011, the Tokyo District Court expressed its 
suspicion about the constitutionality of not having a system in place for 
allowing voters abroad to exercise their constitutional rights in regard 
to reviewing the performance of justices.65  In the Japanese justice 
review system, voters go to the House of Representative’s polling 
station and receive a sheet with the justices’ names.66  If voters are not 
satisfied with the performance of a specific justice, they write “X” in a 
blank space above that justice’s name to signal that they wish to dismiss 
the justice.67  The government argued that legislators have wide 
discretion to establish review systems and that in this specific case, the 
 
60. Sakura Murakami, Tokyo District Court Holds First Hearing on Expats’ 
Right to Vote on Supreme Court Justices, JAPAN TIMES (June 11, 2018), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/06/11/national/tokyo-district-court-holds-
first-hearing-expats-right-vote-supreme-court-justices/#.XizNdy2ZM0p. 
61. Kokka Baishō Hō [State Redress Act], Law No. 125 of 1947, art. 1(1) 
(Japan).  
62. Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 28, 2019, Heisei 30 (gyo wa) 
no. 143, Heisei 30 (wa) no. 11936, Lex/DB no. 25570333 (“Failure to give citizens, 
age 18 or above, who live abroad, the opportunity to exercise the right of national 
examination is to guarantee the right as a unique right to some people and to violate 
equal opportunity to exercise the same right to others. . . . It also violates Article 22 (2) 
of the Constitution, which guarantees the freedom to travel abroad, because it restricts 
their right only for living abroad.”). 
63. Murakami, supra note 60.  
64. Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 28, 2019, Heisei 30 (gyo wa) 
no. 143, Heisei 30 (wa) no. 11936, Lex/DB no. 25570333 (“[I]t is reasonable to 
understand that the constitution guarantees equal opportunity to exercise the right of 
examination in the national examination, that is, to vote.”). 
65. Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] April 26, 2011, 2136 HANREI 
JIHŌ [HANJI] 13 (Japan). 
66. Saikō Saibansho Kokumin Sinsa Hō [Law of the People’s Examination of 
the Supreme Court Judges], Law No. 136 of 1947, arts. 12, 14, 15 (Japan). 
67. Id. art. 15. 
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legislators did not have enough time to go through the process of 
sending the ballots to Japanese citizens abroad.68  However, the district 
court rejected the government’s argument and found that the 
legislature’s inaction “possibly violated the Constitution although [the 
court] did not grant compensation to the plaintiffs.”69  Ultimately, in 
2019, the Tokyo District Court condemned the legislature for failing to 
provide opportunities for justice review to Japanese citizens residing 
abroad because of its unreasonable delay and declared the practice 
unconstitutional.70 
B. Legislative Action on Voting Rights for Japanese Abroad 
Before analyzing the Tokyo District Court decision, it will help if 
we examine similar voting rights cases.  The Constitution declares the 
principle that voters have equal rights,71 and the Public Office Election 
Act provides a detailed procedure for voting.72  In 1998, the Public 
Office Election Act was revised to enable elections outside of Japan.73  
Until 1998, voters living outside of Japan could exercise voting rights 
only in elections for “proportional representation in the House of 
 
68. Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] April 26, 2011, 2136 HANREI 
JIHŌ [HANJI] 4 (Japan); Editorial: Indictment of Diet Inaction Over Rights to Review 
Justices, ASAHI SHIMBUN (June 4, 2019, 3:35 PM), 
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201906040042.html [hereinafter Editorial]. 
69. Editorial, supra note 68; Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] April 
26, 2011, 2136 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 1, 5, 8, 15, 18 (Japan). 
70. Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 28, 2019, Heisei 30 (gyo wa) 
no. 143, Heisei 30 (wa) no. 11936, Lex/DB no. 25570333.  
71. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 14, 44 (Japan). 
72. See generally Kōshoku Senkyo Hō [Public Office Election Act], Law 
No. 100 of 1950 (Japan) (laying out qualifications, procedures, and special provisions 
for voting). See MATSUI, supra note 2, at 42 (“[A]ll adult citizens are granted the right 
to vote by the Public Office Election Age,” except “[t]hose who have committed 
crimes and are imprisoned” and “[t]hose who have committed election law 
violations.”). 
73. Shigenori Matsui, The Voting Rights of Japanese Citizens Living Abroad, 
5(2) INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 332, 332 (2007). This revision was further affirmed by the 
Supreme Court in a 2005 decision clarifying that the resident status of a Japanese 
citizen cannot be used to limit their voting rights. Yuichiro Tsuji, Disparidade do 
valor do voto e revisão judicial no Japão [Vote Value Disparity and Judicial Review 
in Japan], 5(2) J. OF CONST. RES. 57, 82 (2018) (Braz.) [hereinafter Tsuji, Vote Value 
Disparity]. See MATSUI, supra note 2, at 43-44. 
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Representatives and the House of Councillors.”74  Voters living outside 
of Japan could not exercise their voting rights in elections in single-seat 
constituencies for the House of Representatives and for the election 
district, which is conducted in all of the forty-seven prefectures for the 
House of Councillors.75 
In 2005, the Supreme Court held that such a system for voters 
outside of Japan was unconstitutional under the Public Office Election 
Act and under the State Redress Act.76  The Supreme Court explained 
that voting rights may only be restricted for justifiable reasons.77  One 
justifiable reason is that without restricting voting rights, it is 
impossible or remarkably difficult to maintain fair elections and to help 
voters exercise their right to vote.78  Articles 43(2), 44, and 47 give the 
Diet discretion to structure electoral systems;79 however, the 
legislature’s discretion to shape the process does not mean it can refuse 
to act, thus it would not easily qualify as a justifiable reason.  The 
Japanese Supreme Court noted that restricting voters’ rights would be 
illegal under the State Redress Act only if the statute expressly infringes 
on citizens’ constitutional rights or if legislative action is expressly 
required to protect voters’ constitutional rights but the legislature fails 
to act.80  After this case, the Public Office Election Act was revised.  
 
74. Matsui, supra note 73, at 333. See MATSUI, supra note 2, at 43-44. 
75. Tsuji, Vote Value Disparity, supra note 73, at 82-83. Today, the electoral 
system has changed. Tottori and Shimane prefectures are merged into one, and 
Tokushima and Kochi prefectures are merged into one because of the principle of 
equality in the Japanese Constitution. In a 2005 decision, all the representative seats 
were distributed among the forty-seven prefectures in accordance with the population. 
Id. at 71. 
76. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 14, 2005, Heisei 13 (Gyo Tsu) no. 82, 83, 
(Gyo Hi) no. 76, 77, 59(7) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 2087 
(Japan). See MATSUI, supra note 2, at 43-44. 
77. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 14, 2005, Heisei 13 (Gyo Tsu) no. 82, 83, 
(Gyo Hi) no. 76, 77, 59(7) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 2087 
(Japan). 
78. Id. (“Such unavoidable grounds cannot be found unless it is deemed to be 
practically impossible or extremely difficult to allow the exercise of the right to vote 
while maintaining fairness in elections without such restrictions.”). 
79. Id. (“Thus, the Constitution basically leaves it to the Diet’s discretion to 
decide the specific mechanism of the election system applicable to members of each 
House.”). 
80. Id. (“In cases where it is obvious that the contents of legislation or legislative 
omission illegally violate citizens’ constitutional rights or where it is absolutely 
15
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Currently, voters can visit the Japanese embassy or vote via mail.81  
Both the 2005 and 2019 decisions demonstrated that people living 
outside of Japan could not exercise their constitutional right to review 
the performance of justices.  Additionally, in 2019, the Tokyo District 
Court held the legislature was negligent for its inaction that prevented 
the plaintiffs from participating in reviewing the performance of 
justices during the 2017 election of the House of Representatives.82 
As the 2005 Supreme Court and the 2019 Tokyo District Court 
decisions explain, the legislature enjoys wide discretion in determining 
the structure of the national examination system.83  Under Japanese 
constitutional studies, it is unconstitutional to adopt a recall system 
because representatives are independent of the voters in electoral 
districts; representatives serve as public officers for all of Japan.84  As 
Part I explained, national sovereignty places too much emphasis on 
legitimacy (authority), which may promote people’s current 
indifference to politics and may allow the legislature to easily break its 
commitments to the public once elected.  Some Japanese scholars on 
 
necessary to take legislative measures to assure the opportunity for citizens to exercise 
constitutional rights and such necessity is obvious, but the Diet has failed to take such 
measures for a long time without justifiable reasons, the legislative act or legislative 
omission by Diet members should exceptionally be deemed to be illegal for the 
purpose of Article 1(1) of the Law Concerning State Liability for Compensation.”). 
81. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Commc’n, Voting System, 
https://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/hoho.html (Japan) (last visited Mar. 6, 2020); 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Procedure for Voting Rights for Japanese Living 
Abroad, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/toko/senkyo/flow.html (Japan) (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2020).  
82. Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 28, 2019, Heisei 30 (gyo wa) 
no. 143, Heisei 30 (wa) no. 11936, Lex/DB no. 25570333. 
83. See Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 28, 2019, Heisei 30 
(gyo wa) no. 143, Heisei 30 (wa) no. 11936, Lex/DB no. 25570333; NIHONKOKU 
KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 41, 43 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho 
[Sup. Ct.] Sept. 14, 2005, Heisei 13 (Gyo Tsu) no. 82, 83, (Gyo Hi) no. 76, 77, 59(7) 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 2087 (Japan).  
84. See MATSUI, supra note 2, at 41-42 (“Even though the Constitution also 
mentions the right to dismiss public officials, the Public Office Election Act does not 
allow voters to dismiss their representatives.”); see also Id. at 42 n.7 (“[S]ome argue 
that citizens should be allowed to dismiss their representatives if the latter violate 
mandates of the voters. However. most academics tend to believe that since the Diet 
members are representatives of all of the people, they should not be dismissed by 
voters from a single election district, even if the district is their own.”).  
16
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the French Constitution have tried to understand the Japanese 
Constitution by studying the French Constitution of 1791’s perspective 
on popular sovereignty.  This perspective was meant to heighten voters’ 
awareness that politics is integral to their ordinary lives.  However, as 
far as Professor Moto is concerned, the ruling party may use the 
outcome of the recall system with non-binding power to justify the 
majoritarian decision.85 
C. How the Recall System Functions at the Local Level 
It is unconstitutional to adopt a recall system for the legislature, 
unless the system is at the local governmental level.  However, the 
Local Government Act has established a recall system in the current 
Constitution.86  The Meiji Constitution does not contain any chapters 
or provisions regarding local government.87  The president of the 
prefecture comes from the central government.88  Chapter 8 of the 
current Constitution contains four provisions announcing the autonomy 
of local government. 89  The Constitution grants local government 
decision making power.90  Local government functions as the school of 
democracy in Japan.  The Local Government Act includes the details of 
how that autonomy is to operate.91  Most constitutional scholars have 
provided descriptive explanations about the purpose of local 
government democracy but have failed to explain the core of local 
government autonomy.92 
 
85. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 149. 
86. Chihō Jichi Hō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, arts. 74-88 
(Japan).  
87. See DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPŌ [MEIJI KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan).  
88. Fuken-sei [Prefectural System], Law No. 1 of 1888 (Japan) (Under the Meiji 
Constitution, the Ministry of Interior appoints the governors of prefectures.).  
89. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], ch. VIII (Japan). 
90. Id.  
91. See generally Chihō Jichi Hō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947 
(Japan); HIROSHI OHTSU, BUNKEN KOKKA NO KENPŌ RIRON [CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF THE DECENTRALIZED STATE] 2-7 (Yushindo 1957) (Japan) (discussing 
local autonomy and the dispute about its meaning among scholars, while also noting 
that the Japanese Supreme Court has not clearly defined what it means in practice). 
92. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 86; OHTSU, supra note 91, at 2-13 (explaining that 
the core refers to the aspects of local government autonomy that may not be infringed 
upon).  
17
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Similar to the European Union, in Japan, the principle of 
subsidiarity works in defining the relationship between the central and 
local government.93  This principle advocates that social and political 
tasks should first be dealt with by the smallest capable authority, such 
as by individual members of the public, and a larger authority should 
step in only once the task exceeds the capabilities of the smaller 
authority.94 
In Japanese central politics, representatives are elected to the Diet 
and among their responsibilities is to pass, modify, or abolish statutes.  
Only the Diet possesses law-making power.  The Prime Minister is 
nominated “from among the members of the Diet”95 and appointed by 
the emperor.96  The Prime Minister is the leader of the cabinet and has 
the power to appoint and remove ministers from the cabinet.97  More 
than half of the ministers should be members of the Diet.98  Thus, in 
Japan, the ruling party manages the cabinet under a parliamentary 
system.  In Japan, the leader of the ruling party is the Prime Minister.99  
Members of the Diet can draft bills, but the cabinet may also submit 
 
93. OHTSU, supra note 91, at 1-6; MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 250; KOJI 
SATO, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 546 (Seibundo 2011) (Japan); Eeva Pavy, Fact Sheets 
on the European Union, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2 (Feb. 2020), 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.2.2.pdf (“The general aim of the 
principle of subsidiarity is to guarantee a degree of independence for a lower authority 
in relation to a higher body or for a local authority in relation to central government. 
It therefore involves the sharing of powers between several levels of authority, a 
principle which forms the institutional basis for federal states. When applied in the 
context of the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity serves to regulate the 
exercise of the Union’s non-exclusive powers. It rules out Union intervention when 
an issue can be dealt with effectively by Member States at central, regional or local 
level and means that the Union is justified in exercising its powers when Member 
States are unable to achieve the objectives of a proposed action satisfactorily and 
added value can be provided if the action is carried out at Union level.”). 
94. Pavy, supra note 93. See generally Yuichiro Tsuji, Local Autonomy and 
Japanese Constitution - David and Goliath, 8(2) S. KOR. LEGIS. RES. INST. J. OF L. 
AND LEGIS. 43 (2018) (discussing how local autonomy functions in Japan and arguing 
for financial independence from the central government).  
95. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 67 (Japan). 
96. Id. art. 6. 
97. Id. arts. 66, 68. 
98. Id. art. 68. 
99. See id. ch. V. 
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bills to the Diet.100  Additionally, under Article 7 of the Constitution, 
the cabinet has unilateral power to dissolve the lower house (the House 
of Representatives).101 
Unlike at the central government level, voters directly choose the 
president of the local government and the members of local 
parliament.102  However, one way the local government follows the 
presidential system is by allowing the governor of the local government 
to submit a proposed ordinance to the local parliament.103  Still, the 
local parliament may reject the governor’s bill.104  Although the local 
governor may not dissolve the local parliament unilaterally, the 
governor may do so if a no-confidence resolution is passed.105  The 
voters may recall a governor and members of the local parliament if 
they obtain the requisite number of signatures as set forth below: 
Generally, one third is required to pass. However, if the total number 
of voters exceeds 400,000 but is less than 800,000, then one sixth of 
the number exceeding 400,000 is required. Moreover, if the total is 
more than 800,000, then one eight of the excess votes are 
required. . . . If the total number [of voters] exceeds 400,000 and is 
800,000 or less, the total number of required votes is obtained by the 
sum of one third of 400,000 and one sixth of the number exceeding 
400,000. If the total number [of voters] exceeds 800,000, the total 
number of required votes is obtained by the sum of one third of 
400,000, one six of the number exceeding 400,000 [up to 800,000], 
and one eight of the number exceeding 800,000.106 
If the signatures are properly and legally submitted to the Election 
Administration Commission, then the election for the recall will be held 
within sixty days.107  The voters may recall/dissolve the local 
 
100. Id. art. 72. 
101. See id. art. 7. 
102. Chihō Jichi Hō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, art. 17 
(Japan). 
103. Id. arts. 148, 149. 
104. See id. 
105. Id. art. 178. 
106. Id. art. 81; see also Yanina Welp, THE POLITICS OF RECALL ELECTIONS 99-
100 (2020) (explaining the signature requirements for a recall). 
107. Chihō Jichi Hō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, art. 76(3) 
(Japan); see, e.g., Nagoya Sigikai rikōru shomei wa hōteisu wo 3213 uwamawaru 
19
Tsuji: National Referendum and Popular Sovereignty in Japan
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2020
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  
436 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50 
parliament and its members by fulfilling the same signature 
requirement.108  Accordingly, this system represents direct democracy 
in practice because it involves a close relationship between the voters 
and elected officials of the local government. 
This recall system is part of the political battle between the 
president and the local parliament in Japan.  One example involves 
Mayor Takashi Kawamura of Nagoya city.  In 2009, Kawamura ran for 
Mayor of Nagoya city and proposed a permanent fifty percent reduction 
of the local parliament members’ salaries but also opposed the local 
parliament’s continued existence.109  Kawamura argued that the reason 
Japanese politics are not modernized is taxes support the local 
parliament members’ salaries.110  As a mayor, Kawamura had no power 
to dissolve the parliament unilaterally, thus he collected signatures 
directly from voters to dissolve it.111  The signatures were submitted to 
the election administration commission, which ruled that the signatures 
were void because most did not satisfy the signature requirements.112  
Consequently, the citizens urged the commission to reevaluate the 
signatures.  Eventually, the commission determined that the signature 
 
[Nagoya City Council Recall, Signature Exceeds Legal Quota by 3213], NIHON 
KEIZAI SHIMBUN (Dec. 15, 2010), 
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFD15016_V11C10A2000000/ [hereinafter 
Nagoya City Council Recall]. 
108. Chihō Jichi Hō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, arts. 76(3), 
80(3), 81(2), 83 (Japan). 
109. THE POLITICS OF RECALL ELECTIONS 105-06 (Yanina Welp & Laurence 
Whitehead eds., 2020); see Nagoya sigikai kaisan he rikōru no shomei atsume 
hajimaru [Nagoya Municipal Assembly Disbanded, Recall Signature Collection 
Begins], ASAHI (Aug. 27, 2010, 3:03 PM), 
http://www.asahi.com/special/nagoya/NGY201008270003.html; Chunichi Shimbun, 
‘Face of Election’ Kawamura of Nagoya Now the Odd Man Out, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 
15, 2012), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/12/15/national/face-of-election-
kawamura-of-nagoya-now-the-odd-man-out/#.XmQ3eC2ZM0o [hereinafter ‘Face of 
Election’]. 
110. See Nagoya gin hōshu de saya-ate Sichō vs Jimin nado 3 kaiha [Nagoya, 
Rep. Saya = Mayor VS Liberal Democratic Party], Archipelago Region Selection 
2019, JIJI (Mar. 16, 2019), https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2019031600291&g=pol 
(discussing Kawamura’s efforts to lower municipal taxes and city council salaries, 
which political parties disagreed over). 
111. See id.  
112. Nagoya City Council Recall, supra note 107.  
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requirement was met and the local parliament was dissolved.113  
Subsequently, the city mayor resigned.114  Kawamura was reelected 
with the majority seats of his new party, Tax Reduction Japan (Genzei 
Nippon).115  
III. DECLINING STATUS OF THE POLITICAL PARTY  
IN JAPANESE POLITICS 
The Japanese Constitution is in the third phase of the German 
scholar Heinrich Triepel’s theory regarding countries constitutional and 
legal approaches in regulating political party phenomenon: approval 
and legalization.116  Heinrich Triepel sets forth four phases of relations 
between parties and the state: the abatement of parties, the ignoring of 
parties, the legalization of parties, and the constitutional incorporation 
of parties.117  The Japanese Constitution does not have any provision 
tailored to a political party,118 but there are various legislative measures 
that govern parties.  In Germany, the Weimar Constitution led to the 
loss of democracy through its flawed procedures and allowed the Nazis 
 
113. Nagoya Recall Petition Fails, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 25, 2010), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2010/11/25/national/nagoya-recall-petition-
fails/#.Xm7EO5P0lZ0; see THE POLITICS OF RECALL ELECTIONS, supra note 109, at 
105. 
114. Nagoya rikōru shomei 22000 nin bun no igi sinsei [Nagoya Recall 
Signature, 22000 Complaints Are Filed], NIKKEI (Nov. 30, 2010), 
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFD29033_Z21C10A1CN8000/; THE 
POLITICS OF RECALL ELECTIONS, supra note 109, at 105. 
115. Maverick as Hell, ECONOMIST (Feb. 10, 2011), 
https://www.economist.com/asia/2011/02/10/maverick-as-hell; ‘Face of Election’, 
supra note 108; Election of Nagoya Mayor 2017, CHŪNICHI (Apr. 24, 2017), 
https://www.chunichi.co.jp/senkyo/nagoyashicho2017/. 
116. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 290; NONAKA ET AL., KENPŌ II, supra note 5, at 
55; MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 156-57; see also Tsuji, Vote Value Disparity, supra 
note 73, at 77. 
117. Małgorzata Lorencka, at al., The Constitutionalization Process of Political 
Parties in Poland: Party System Evolution After 1918 188-89, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332269303_The_constitutionalization_pro
cess_of_political_parties_in_Poland_Party_system_evolution_after_1918 (last visite
d Mar. 29, 2020). 
118. See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan). 
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to rule the government.119  The Japanese Constitution has a possibility 
of changing to the Fortified Democracy (Streitbare Demokratie).120  
Fortified Democracy is the idea that democracies “adopt[] certain 
measures to defend themselves against being overthrown by 
antidemocratic actors.”  It was “[t]he fact that the Nazis could rely on 
lawful means in their quest for political power [that] made post-war 
Germany particularly conscious of the need to protect its re-established 
democracy against anti-democratic forces.”121 
The Japanese Constitution expressly protects freedom of 
association and thereby the existence of political parties.122  However, 
the Constitution is silent about the private and public character of a 
political party.123  The Constitution authorizes judicial reviews, but it 
does not grant any court exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional 
cases.124  Additionally, the Constitution does not adopt a special 
procedure to review political parties’ actions that might violate the 
political process or try to overthrow the democratic order.125  Except 
for a few cases, the Japanese Supreme Court reviews legal disputes.  In 
 
119. See BRIA 21 3 b The German Weimar Republic: Why Did Democracy 
Fail?, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUND., 
https://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-21-3-b-the-german-weimar-
republic-why-did-democracy-fail (last visited Mar. 7, 2020) (“The [Weimar] 
Constitution also gave [the president] the power to temporarily suspend constitutional 
rights and let the chancellor rule by decree in a “state of emergency.”).  
120. Rights and Wrongs Under the ECHR: The Prohibition of Abuse of Rights 
in Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights – Chapter 8 Summary, 
CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rights-and-
wrongs-under-the-echr/german-wehrhafte-
demokratie/0226944636C4B209AAD6140130E1426F (last visited Mar. 7, 2020) 
[hereinafter Rights and Wrongs Chapter 8 Summary] (explaining the term “streitbare 
Demokratie”); MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 351. 
121. Rights and Wrongs Chapter 8 Summary, supra note 120. 
122. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 21 (Japan); MOTO, 
KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 351. 
123. See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan). 
124. Yuichiro Tsuji, Constitutional Law Court in Japan, 66 TSUKUBA J. OF L. 
AND POL. 65, 65 (2016); Japanese Government: Supreme Court of Japan, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Supreme-Court-of-
Japan (last visited Mar. 7, 2020). 
125. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 160. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 291; See 
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan). 
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Germany, democracy aims to protect human rights and is successful,126 
but in Japan, it may be abused to justify the majoritarian decision.  This 
may be because of the two countries’ different histories and 
constitutions.127  In Japan, it is not clear what protections democracy is 
providing to political parties and what limitations, if any, it is imposing 
on them.  Regarding Japanese politics, Professor Moto is concerned 
with a majority excluding the minority party from the political process 
in the name of democracy.128  In Japan, the possibility of adopting a 
referendum presents the following question: Will the referendum prove 
that political parties’ function and legitimacy as a medium between the 
voters and representatives has declined? 
Since the Second World War, Japanese political parties have 
competed against each other in a complexly twisted pattern; sometimes 
they join together, and other times they separate.129  The new 
Constitution was established in 1947, and the Japanese Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) was formed in 1955; the LDP “has held power 
almost continuously since its formation.”130  The Japanese people have 
witnessed severe factional disputes within the LDP, which has center-
right and leftist factions.  Japanese people have also seen a change of 
leadership inside the LDP, as it changed from the leading political party 
to the opposition.  For example, from 2009 to 2013, there were 
significant changes as to the governing political parties.  In 2009, the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) gained control of government.131  
Subsequently, in March 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake 
occurred, which was followed by the voters’ disappointment with the 
 
126. See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], § I translation at http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html (Ger.). 
127. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 351 (Moto thinks that although there is no 
provision for Fortified Democracy in the Japanese Constitution, in actuality, such 
tactics may still be used in the political arena).  
128. Id. at 158-59, 351. 
129. Id. at 171. 
130. Raymond Christensen, Liberal-Democratic Party of Japan, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Liberal-Democratic-
Party-of-Japan (last visited Mar. 14, 2020). 
131. Id. 
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government’s response to this large-scale natural disaster.132  In 2012, 
the Abe cabinet was formed, and the lower house was dissolved.133  
Since then, opposing parties have been unstable and unable to compete 
with the ruling party or to reflect the voice of voters.134  This chapter 
reviews the statutes that regulate, activate, and aim to protect political 
parties but that do not function well.  Perhaps as a result, political parties 
are losing their ability to act as a medium between voters and the 
legislature. 
A. Historical Role of Political Parties in Japan  
Before and After the Second World War 
After the Shogunate government in the Edo era (from 1603 and 
1868), the new Meiji government followed the Prussian Constitution 
when drafting the Meiji Constitution by implementing a framework that 
would similarly allow strong government leadership.135  Under the 
Meiji Constitution, sovereignty belonged to the emperor, and the 
government provided human rights to the people.136  Thus, the 
government reserved the power to restrict human rights under the law.  
The Honoratiorenpartei137 has existed since the Meiji Constitution.138  
Under the nondemocratic electoral system, celebrities and political 
leaders connected with each other and took over control of the political 
 
132. See Kenneth Pletcher & John P. Rafferty, Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 
of 2011, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Japan-
earthquake-and-tsunami-of-2011 (last updated Mar. 4, 2020). 
133. Christensen, supra note 130. 
134. See Takuya Miyazato, et al., Naze seiken wo taosenai noka [Why You Can’t 
Defeat the Government], NHK POL. MAG. (Dec. 27, 2019), 
https://www.nhk.or.jp/politics/articles/feature/26402.html (discussing the factors that 
have contributed to the current Japanese administration being the longest in the history 
of Japan). 
135. MAKOTO OHISHI, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ SI 60-61, 74, 139 (Yuhikaku 2005) 
(discussing why the government chose the Prussian Constitution as a model instead 
of others).  
136. See DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPŌ [MEIJI KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 1, 
ch. II (Japan).  
137. This term means a “political party comprised of local or national 
dignitaries.” Honoratiorenpartei, DICT.CC, https://www.dict.cc/german-
english/Honoratiorenpartei.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2020). 
138. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 156 (discussing the transformation of 
political parties in Japan). 
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party, and there was no inner discipline inside the political party to 
counteract that.  In the 1910s, the democratic movement was 
incorporated into the political,139 social, and cultural spheres; the 
movement became known as Taishō Democracy.140  Taishō was the 
posthumous title of the emperor, and Taishō democracy was introduced 
by Professor Sakuzō Yoshino through his theory that democracy is the 
essence of constitutional politics.141  In 1925, universal suffrage was 
established142 along with a notorious law, the Maintenance of the Public 
Order Act (MPOA).143  MPOA gave the power to arrest political 
offenders, such as socialists, to a specific police force.144 
Immediately after the Meiji Restoration, people from the four major 
prefectures (Satsuma, Chōshu, Tosa, and Hizen) monopolized major 
roles in government.145  Taishō Democracy was created to resist 
political domination.  During this Taishō Democratic era, politicians 
tried to establish a people’s political party comprised of general 
citizens.  Japanese constitutional studies focused on how to achieve a 
democratic political system under the Meiji Constitution.  In the 
May 15 incident of 1932, (called the 511 incident), young naval 
military officers intruded into governmental offices and Prime Minister 
Tsuyoshi Inukai’s house.146  During the 511 incident, Prime Minister 
 
139. See OHISHI, supra note 135, at 251-52. 
140. SŌICHI SASAKI, RIKKEN HI-RIKKEN [CONSTITUTIONALISM AND NON-
CONSTITUTIONALISM] 223 (Kōdansha bunko 2016) (Japan) (explaining how Taishō 
democracy originated).  
141. Id.; OHISHI, supra note 135, at 242 (Ohishi believes the Taishō democracy 
movement was not strong enough to change the original governmental structure); 
ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 21. 
142. Shūgin Senkyo Hō [The Election Law of the Member of the House of 
Representatives], Law No. 82 of 1925 (abolished) (Japan) (suffrage applied to males 
who had attained at least twenty-five years of age).  
143. See Chian Iji Hō [Maintenance of Public Order Act], Law No. 46 of 1925 
(Japan).  
144. Id. arts. 2-4.  
145. Shunsuke Sumikawa, The Meiji Restoration: Roots 
of Modern Japan (Mar. 29, 1999) (unpublished thesis, Lehigh University), 
https://www.lehigh.edu/~rfw1/courses/1999/spring/ir163/Papers/pdf/shs3.pdf 
(discussing the consolidation of power achieved by the four prefectures).  
146. Jeff Kingston, 1936 Coup Failed, but Rebels Killed Japan’s ‘Keynes’, 
JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 20, 2016), 
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was killed.147  Then, four years later, on February 26, 1936 (called the 
226 incident), young army officers led around 1,400 officers to 
overthrow the government; however, even though the coup d’état 
failed, militarism developed in Japan.148  In the 1940s, existing political 
parties were dissolved and incorporated into the Imperial Rule 
Assistance Association (IRAA or Taisei yokusankai) in the House of 
Imperial Diet in the Fumimaro Konoe cabinet.149  IRAA organized and 
unified the will of the Imperial Diet, and it endorsed the Hideki Tōjō 
cabinet’s military actions.150 
The history shows the evolving role of political parties in Japanese 
government, which was continuously referred to by previous 
constitutions despite sovereignty residing with the emperor.  Today, the 
ruling party organizes the cabinet in the parliamentary system to 
maintain democratic legitimacy and stability under the current 
Constitution.  Traditionally, political parties were expected to 
communicate the people’s conflicting beliefs and wishes in the 
parliament.  However, the IRAA oppressed political parties.151  Some 
may argue that the current Japanese Constitution is intentionally silent 
about the constitutional role and mission of political parties.  They may 
argue the Constitution is silent because it expected a political party to 
arise from the new democratic ideals developing in Japan after the 
Second World War, whose capabilities it did not want to restrict. 
Currently, the role of political parties is influenced by the two 
houses of the Diet.  When the current Constitution was established, the 
House of Councillors functioned to check and review the lower house, 
the House of Representatives.152  As political parties developed and 
governed both Houses of the Diet, the role of the House of Councillors 




147. Id.  
148. Id. 
149. SATO, supra note 93, at 12; see also OHISHI, supra note 135, at 248. 
150. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 43; SATO, supra note 93, at 12, 60, 62.  
151. HIDEKI SHIBUTANI, KENPŌ [JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2ND] 541 
(Yuhikaku 2013); SATO, supra note 93, at 12. 
152. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 299-300; SATO, supra note 93, at 441-44; MOTO, 
KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 201, 217. 
153. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 289; MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 217. 
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as the medium between the voters and the Diet diminished.  On the 
other hand, the number of unaffiliated voters increased.154  Unaffiliated 
voters do not support any specific political party because they do not 
consider politics a central focus of their lives.  Such voters do not 
believe that there are good political parties to elect because the existing 
Japanese political parties frequently change their positions and may do 
so simply to join with the one political party that holds the most power. 
B. Political Party’s Strong Control  
Under a Single-Seat Constituency System 
In 1994, an electoral system, called the single-seat constituency 
electoral system, was established.155  Under this system, a political 
party may endorse only one official candidate in its electoral district.156  
As political parties received a large amount of financial support, the 
leading members, such as those in the LDP, gained power.157  
Simultaneously, the roles of the Secretary General, the Chairperson of 
the Policy Research Council, the Chairperson of the General Council, 
and the Head of the Election Strategy Headquarters were strengthened; 
in the LDP, these roles manage the party’s internal functions, and most 
importantly, they endorse the members as political candidates and 
 
154. Tanaka Aiji, Japan’s Independent Voters, Yesterday and Today, NIPPON 
(Aug. 16, 2012), https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a01104/japan’s-independent-
voters-yesterday-and-today.html.  
155. Kōshoku Senkyo Hō [Public Office Election Act], Law No. 100 of 1950, 
art. 86 (Japan); The Government of Modern Japan: Elections, ASIA FOR EDUCATORS, 
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1900_elections.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 
2020) (“Perhaps the most important result of the LDP’s temporary loss of power was 
the coalition government’s reform of the election system, enacted in 1994. The 
reformers’ primary goal was to create a system in which there are two main parties 
that regularly alternate power, as is the case in the United States. Up until that time, 
the Japanese system consisted of one lopsidedly large party (the LDP) dominating 
three or four smaller opposition parties that were never able to win control of the 
government.”); see also MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 163.  
156. Kōshoku Senkyo Hō [Public Office Election Act], Law No. 100 of 1950, 
art. 86-2 (Japan) (If a political candidate is endorsed by political party, he or she can 
put his or her name on a list of candidates for the proportional representative election). 
157. See Masayuki Yuda, How Does Japan Fund Election Campaigns?, NIKKEI 
ASIAN REVIEW (Oct. 11, 2017), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Finance/How-does-
Japan-fund-election-campaigns.  
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distribute money to the members for the next election.158  Leading party 
members can officially endorse who they want as the candidate for their 
political party in the single-seat constituency electoral district.159  The 
influential power of these political endorsements has the effect of 
pressuring these candidates to follow that political party’s policy.  As a 
result, candidates tend to mainly consider the political parties’ will, and 
not that of the voters.  This reinforces the above-mentioned 
constitutional theory that once elected, representatives are independent 
from the voters’ will. 
The Political Funds Control Act (PFCA) aims to limit the allowable 
contributions to a candidate.160  For example, the candidate may receive 
funds through a political party or political association.161  However, the 
political party may only receive up to 20 million yen a year in individual 
contributions and up to 100 million yen a year in corporate 
contributions from each corporation.162  PFCA reflects the belief that 
political bribery in the late 1980s caused funds to flow primarily 
through political parties.163 
Additionally, under the Political Party Subsidies Act (PPSA), 
political parties may receive government subsidies164 for their 
 
158. See generally LDP Constitution: Chapter II Executive Bodies, LIB DEMS, 
https://www.jimin.jp/english/about-ldp/constitution/104146.html (last visited Mar. 
15, 2020) (discussing the different roles in the LDP and their interrelation). 
159. ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 304-05. 
160. See generally Seiji Shikin Kisei Hō [Political Funds Control Act], Law No. 
194 of 1948 (Japan) (laying out requirements and restrictions of political funding).  
161. Id. art. 3 (defining political party and political organization, as well as 
laying out their purpose). 
162. Id. art. 21-3 The ceiling for a corporation’s contribution depends on the 
size of the corporation. Id.  
163. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 165; SATO, supra note 93, at 422; Daisuke 
Akimoto, Power and Money in Japanese Politics, JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 16, 2020), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/02/16/commentary/japan-
commentary/power-money-japanese-politics/#.XmV9gC2ZN0s (discussing the 
bribery scandals that have shaken Japanese politics and how the PFCA regulates 
political party funding). 
164. Seitō Josei Hō [Party Subsidies Act], Law No. 5 of 1994, art. 1 (Japan) (“In 
view of the importance of the political parties’ function in parliamentary democracy, 
this law provides that the state should subsidize political parties with political grants, 
and the necessary political party requirements and notifications. . . . By stipulating 
procedures for the award of grants and by reporting their uses and taking other 
necessary measures, we will promote the sound development of political activities of 
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candidates, which come from the people’s taxes.165  Every year, 
Japanese people pay 250 yen for this public fund, which amounts to a 
total of approximately 32 billion yen a year.166  Only eligible political 
parties may receive public funding without spending restrictions.167  
PPSA public funds compose around seventy to eighty percent of the 
income of the ruling and opposing party.168  Half of the public funds for 
political parties are distributed according to the number of 
representatives each party has in the Diet and based on the number of 
votes the party earned in past elections.169  Therefore, the majority 
party, having earned the majority of votes in past elections, may receive 
more funding than other parties.170  Currently, the statutes governing 
political party funding work to maintain the status quo, which benefits 
the majority.171  Like the public funding support system, the single-seat 
constituency system reinforces the ruling party’s power.  Therefore, 
smaller opposition parties have a slim chance of winning control of the 
government. 
 
political parties and ensure their fairness and thereby promote the sound development 
of democratic politics.”).   
165. Id. art. 4(2) (“Political parties should pay special attention to the fact that 
the subsidy will be financed by taxes and other precious resources collected from the 
people, and should be aware of their responsibilities and should not rely on the 
public.”).  
166. Id. art. 7. The total is based on the population of Japan, which as of 2017 
is 126.8 million (126.8 million times 250 yen equals 31.7 billion yen). Population, 
Total – Japan, WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=JP (last visited Mar. 
8, 2020). 
167. Id. art. 2 (defining political party as it relates to this law). 
168. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 167. 
169. LIBRARY OF CONG., REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN 
ELECTIONS: JAPAN 58 (2019), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/elections/foreign-
involvement/foreign-involvement-in-elections.pdf.  
170. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 165-66. 
171. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 162. 
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C. Political Parties and the Judiciary 
The current Constitution does not regulate the conduct of political 
parties,172 and the judiciary refuses to override the autonomy of political 
parties;173 therefore, political parties may make decisions that infringe 
upon their members’ rights.  The Hakamada case illustrates how the 
judiciary has refused to intervene in the internal disputes of political 
parties.174  In Hakamada, the Japanese communist party expelled one 
of its members, Satomi Hakamada, and filed a lawsuit to evict him from 
his house, alleging that the property belonged to the party.175  First, the 
Supreme Court noted that political party’s disputes that do not directly 
relate to the general civic order would fall outside of its jurisdiction.176  
Then, the Court reviewed the procedures for expelling and evicting 
party members and found that the party’s decision to expel and evict 
Hakamada was not illegal.177  This case illustrates that the judiciary 
intervenes in the internal conflicts of a political party only when the 
issue implicates the Constitution’s freedom of association provision. 
Under the Constitution, a political party must serve as a medium 
between the voters and their representatives.178  Thus, political parties 
should bring various perspectives into the parliament.  However, this 
can be challenging because party leaders exercise control over their 
members.  Ultimately, the majority party controls the parliament and 
weakens the House of Councillors’ role by restricting free spirited 
discussion among members.  As noted above, although the judiciary 
 
172. See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 21 (Japan). The 
Constitution only expresses the freedom of assembly and association. Id. 
173. See Jessica Conser, Achievement of Judicial Effectiveness through Limits 
on Judicial Independence: A Comparative Approach, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
256, 311 (“In addition to refusing to answer political questions, Japanese courts 
generally refuse to answer quasi-political questions.”); see also MOTO, KENPŌ, supra 
note 1, at 164; ASHIBE, supra note 1, at 346; SATO, supra note 93, at 420. 
174. See generally Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Dec. 20,1988, Showa 60 (o) no. 
4, 155, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHU MINJIHEN [SHUMIN] 405 (Japan) (discussing 
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may intervene in political party decision making, it prefers to defer to 
the party’s decision, unless the dispute raises a constitutional issue. 
  
IV. GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO STOP A REFERENDUM 
 
The Japanese judiciary may use constitutional justifications to 
prohibit binding and non-binding national referendums.  To understand 
the extent to which holding a national referendum is possible, it is 
helpful to review several judicial decisions regarding local 
governments.  Even after a national referendum or resolution of the 
parliament reaches a certain outcome, the judiciary may use several 
legal principles, like estoppel,179 to prevent the government from 
abusing the outcome such as by implementing policies that betray 
people’s expectations. 
A. Local Ordinance Annulled by the Judiciary 
In a classic case of estoppel, a construction company planned to 
construct an intermediate treatment facility of waste disposal in 
Kii Nagashima city of Mie prefecture.180  In November 1993, the 
company submitted a building plan to the Mie prefecture.181  The 
company’s application to build and operate was granted in May 
1995.182  Before such events, Mie prefecture and Kii Nagashima city 
held meetings and consultations in regard to passing a city water quality 
ordinance, allegedly to protect water reserves.183  In March 1994, the 
 
179. Estoppel is “[a] bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or right that 
contradicts what one has said or done before, or what has been legally established as 
true.” Estoppel, CORNELL LAW, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/estoppel (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2020).  
180. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 24, 2004, Heisei 12 (gyo tsu) no. 209, 
58(9) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 2356 (Japan) (The Supreme 
Court concluded that the city should have advised appropriately to maintain water 
quality and prevent water shortage. Thus, the Supreme Court remanded to the high 
court to review if administrative disposition was illegal in violation of consideration 
of the party. On remand, the Nagoya High court held that the city was in violation of 
consideration and illegally designated the business company as a business operator 
under the local ordinance.). 
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Kii Nagashima city parliament passed a city ordinance to regulate 
businesses that may cause water pollution or water shortages by 
prohibiting them from constructing certain facilities.184  Later, the city 
council found that the company had taken ninety-five cubic meters of 
water, thus causing water shortages.185  Accordingly, the city ordinance 
prohibited the company from building the intermediate treatment 
facility, despite the fact that the company’s application to build and 
operate was previously granted.186  In fact, the city ordinance was 
specifically passed to stop the company from constructing the 
intermediate treatment facility of waste disposal in the city.187 
However, the Supreme Court held that Kii Nagashima city should 
have given the company an opportunity to be heard and should have 
advised it to construct according to the guidelines of the ordinance.188  
The city government must provide a business that has already prepared 
for or began its business activities that may be regulated under a new 
city ordinance with the opportunity to accept such ordinance and to 
agree to abide by and fulfill the conditions thereof, before suspending 
 
184. Id. 
185. Id. (“On May 9, 1995, the jokoku appellant responded that 95 kiloliter of 
underground water would be consumed per day, and then on May 16, the Council 
informed the jokoku appellee of its view that the Facility should be recognized as a 
place of business subject to regulation [under the ordinance].”). 
186. Id. 
187. Id. (“Under such circumstances, the jokoku appellee can be deemed to have 
known the fact that the jokoku appellant had already initiated the procedure relating 
to the application for permission of the establishment of industrial waste treatment 
facility before the establishment of the Ordinance, and have had the opportunity to 
consider, through the procedure, what measures should be taken by the town 
government to balance the necessity to establish the Facility and the necessity to 
protect the water source.”). 
188. Id. (“Assuming that, before making the Decision, the jokoku appellee had 
the duty to sufficiently consult with the jokoku appellant through the procedure 
provided under the ordinance, while taking into account the jokoku appellant’s 
position [of having relied on the prior approval to start building] mentioned above, 
provide appropriate instructions to the jokoku appellant to correct the expected 
amount of water intake for the purpose of protecting water source, by encouraging the 
jokoku appellant to limit the amount of underground water to be used for the facility, 
and give due consideration not to unreasonably harm the position of the jokoku 
appellant. The decision would inevitably be deemed to be illegal if it had been made 
in violation of this duty.”). 
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its activity.189  This case illustrates how the local government may pass 
particular local ordinances to specifically target certain businesses or 
individuals.  However, this case also demonstrates that the judiciary 
may ultimately prohibit the local government from passing certain 
ordinances that intentionally target a specific business or individual. 
B. Local Parliament’s Resolution Violates Relationship of Trust 
In another case, a company planned to construct a paper production 
plant in Ginoza village in Okinawa prefecture.190  The company 
requested permission from the local government to receive a parcel of 
land and to build the production plant.191  In 1971, the president of the 
village made an official statement, approved by the local parliament, 
that the village would fully cooperate in building the paper production 
plant.192  The local parliament decided to offer the requested land, 
placing the construction of the production plant in motion.193  
Subsequently, in 1973, the village elected a new president who objected 
to building the plant.194  The new president refused to pay for the plant’s 
construction.195  Accordingly, the company sued the village for 
compensatory damages.196 
The Supreme Court held that the village unreasonably and illegally 
destroyed the relationship of trust it had created with the company.197  
Once the village took an official position with the parliament’s 
resolution, endorsing the plant’s construction, the company relied on 
this position and began building.198  Construction had progressed, but 
 
189. Id. 
190. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Jan. 27, 1981, Showa 51 (o) no. 1338, 38(1) 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 35 (Japan); see also GYOSEIHOU 
HANREI HYAKUSEN 52-53 (7th ed., vol. I 2017) (Japan) (summarizing the paper 
production plant case).  
191. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Jan. 27, 1981, Showa 51 (o) no. 1338, 38(1) 
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all of a sudden, the new president refused to cooperate and compensate; 
this caused the company to suffer monetary loss.  The Supreme Court 
explained that electing a new president of local government may result 
in policy changes; thus, to avoid unreasonable destruction of trust, a 
private party should be given reasonable notice of the upcoming policy 
changes.199 
C. Local Referendum Regarding U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa 
Okinawa constitutes less than one percent of the total land of Japan 
where around seventy percent of all U.S. military bases in Japan are 
located.200  Since Okinawa became a Japanese territory in 1972, it has 
had frequent conflicts with the central government regarding the 
presence of U.S. military bases.  Analyzing this issue will illustrate how 
the current Constitution addresses local governments’ autonomy.  
Article 95 of the Japanese Constitution provides appropriate procedures 
for enacting special local laws.201  However, local governments have 
used local referendums to promote specific local policies, instead of 
following procedures provided by Article 95.202 
The local referendum process can be completed in two ways: 
(1) through the Political Office Election Act203 and Local Government 
Act,204 by requesting signatures from one-fiftieth of the total voters with 
the consent of the local parliament; and (2) through the local parliament 
by passing a local ordinance using only the local referendum 
 
199. Id. 
200. Justin McCurry, Okinawa Referendum: Everything You Need to Know, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2019, 7:35 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/22/okinawa-referendum-everything-
you-need-to-know. 
201. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 95 (Japan) (“A special 
law, applicable only to one local public entity, cannot be enacted by the Diet without 
the consent of the majority of the voters of the local public entity concerned, obtained 
in accordance with the law.”). 
202. SHIBUTANI, supra note 151, at 745. 
203. Kōshoku Senkyo Hō [Public Office Election Act], Law No. 100 of 1950 
(Japan). 
204. Chihō Jichi Hō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, art. 74 
(Japan).  
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procedure.205  A local ordinance may set forth the requirements for 
voter eligibility, such as age, and residency or citizenship, and may 
determine whether the referendum will be legally binding.206 
The government of the Okinawa prefecture has used the local 
referendum mechanism to determine whether it should rearrange and 
reduce U.S. military bases in Okinawa and whether it should review the 
Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement.  In December 2018, the central 
government proposed that a U.S. military base be relocated to Henoko 
bay area in Okinawa.207  In October 2018, Denny (Yasuhiro) Tamaki 
became the governor of the prefecture.208  In February 2019, Okinawa 
held a referendum regarding the relocation of the Futenma U.S. air base 
to Henoko.209  Some local cities strongly opposed holding this 
referendum; however, the referendum concluded with over seventy 
percent of voters voting against the relocation.210  As a result, Tamaki 
resisted the central government’s plan to relocate the U.S. base to 
Henoko bay area and opposed the current Japan-U.S. defense and 
security policies.211  Tamaki argued that the U.S. base is a heavy burden 
that rests solely on the people of Okinawa.212  The result of this local 
referendum impacted the central government’s decision making. 
 
205. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 256; SHIBUTANI, supra note 151, at 747-
48.  
206. SHIBUTANI, supra note 151, at 748 (arguing that a local referendum with 
binding power is unconstitutional). 
207. Justin McCurry, Okinawa Rejects New US Military Base but Abe Vows to 
Push on, GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2019, 9:05 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/24/okinawa-referendum-rejects-new-
us-military-base-but-abe-likely-to-press-on. The central government led by Prime 
Minister Abe pushed for this relocation even though the voters of Henoko rejected the 
move in a referendum. Id. 
208. Mari Yamaguchi, AP Explains: The New Okinawa Governor and US 
Military Bases, AP NEWS (Oct. 1, 2018), 
https://apnews.com/d991048b5029481094be35ec600a322a/AP-Explains:-The-new-
Okinawa-governor-and-US-military-bases.  
209. McCurry, supra note 207. 
210. Id. 
211. Yamaguchi, supra note 208. 
212. Gerry Partido, Tamaki Tells Governor US Bases a ‘[B]urden’ to Okinawa, 
PNC (Aug. 30, 2019), https://pncguam.com/tamaki-tells-governor-us-bases-a-
burden-to-okinawa/. 
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D. Types of Local Referendum: Permanent or Temporary 
There are three types of local referendum.  First, as mentioned 
above, the Japanese Constitution has a special provision regarding 
referendum that is applicable to local governments.  It requires the 
consent of the majority of the voters of the local public entity involved.  
The second type is provided by the statutory referendum in the Local 
Government Act, which allows voters to dissolve the local 
parliament,213 recall members of the local parliament,214 or recall the 
governor.215  The third type involves a local referendum via a local 
ordinance.216 
There are two types of local referendums via local ordinance: 
(1) temporary referendum and (2) permanent referendum.  Temporary 
referendum is provided by the Local Government Act.217  For the 
temporary referendum, the local parliament initiates a local referendum 
via a local ordinance after receiving a specific proposal from the 
governor or members of the local parliament, or a local resident’s 
request.218  Temporary referendums have the advantage of a flexible 
design as to the referendum’s theme.  Moreover, the referendum’s goals 
are clear, allowing voters to deliberate and preventing potential abuse 
of the referendum.  Even after a local parliament passes an ordinance, 
it takes time to determine the theme and requirements, such as voter 
eligibility.  One negative aspect of a local ordinance is that it may be 
too flexible, allowing for manipulation and abuse of the outcome. 
For permanent referendum, the local parliament’s resolution 
establishes the referendum’s eligibility requirements and procedures 
 
213. Chihō Jichi Hō [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, arts. 76(3), 
77 (Japan). 
214. Id. arts. 79, 80(3). 
215. Id. arts. 81(2), 82. 
216. Id. arts.12, 74. 
217. See id.  
218. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 256-57 (arguing that the local governments 
should be given sufficient time to establish the framework for a local referendum); 
SATO, supra note 93, at 561-62 (arguing that giving a local referendum binding power 
would be unconstitutional because it would emphasize direct democracy, while the 
Constitution emphasizes representative democracy).  
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through ordinance in advance.219  With the procedure determined in 
advance, it takes less time to open a referendum than it would without 
the local parliament’s resolution.  When the ordinance is accepted, the 
referendum will be opened without the local parliament’s resolution.  
The negative aspect of this type of permanent referendum is that 
without a resolution, the referendum’s requirements might be too 
abstract.  This might cause controversies, abuse of the referendum 
process, and waste of time and resources.  The referendum 
administrator has the ultimate discretion to decide whether to hold the 
referendum or not.220  The referendum administrator’s decision 
regarding holding the referendum may not be supported by voters, 
which may cause potential litigation.  Local parliament’s discretionary 
power to decide whether to hold the referendum is the key difference 
between the permanent and temporary referendums. 
E. Local Versus National Agreements  
Regarding Nuclear Power Plant Reactivation 
In Japan, nuclear power plants generate substantial financial profit 
for local inhabitants.  At the same time, however, such plants pose risks 
to the lives and health of people living near the reactor.  Currently, no 
statute requires the consent of the local government to reactivate a 
nuclear power plant.  After the LDP took over the government in 2012, 
the Abe cabinet announced that nuclear energy is a key power 
supply.221  Recognizing the importance of nuclear energy production, 
new safety regulations, such as the Nuclear Regulation Authority 
 
219. MOTO, KENPŌ, supra note 1, at 256-57; see also Tadashi Ogawa, 
Jōsetsugata jumin tōhyo jōrei ni okeru jumin tōhyo no taishō jikō gaitōsei hiroshima 
kohan heisei 24nen 5gatu 16hi [Requirement of local ordinance Hiroshima High Ct. 
Heisei 24, May 16], 429 JICHI-SOKEN 1, 1-3 (2014). 
220. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Chihō jichi tai ni okeru 
jūmin tōhyō ni tsuite [Local Referendum in Local Government], 
https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000087296.pdf (Japan) (last visited Mar. 9, 
2020).  
221. Tom Corben, Nuclear Power in the New Abe Cabinet, DIPLOMAT 
(Sept. 20, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/nuclear-power-in-the-new-abe-
cabinet/. 
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(NRA), were passed, and those nuclear power plants that met the new 
standards were reactivated.222 
Some nuclear power plant operators reached an agreement with the 
local government regarding new safety measures for nuclear power 
production, such as environmental monitoring, accountability for harm 
caused, investigation by the local government, risk communication, 
compensation, and obtaining consent before making additions or 
changes in the building of the nuclear power plant.  This agreement is 
not binding, but it forms a foundation for the local government’s 
involvement in decision making and helps maintain trust between the 
operator and the local people.  In April 2018, Japan Atomic Power 
Company (APC) reached an agreement with six cities and 
municipalities for reactivating the second Tokai nuclear power 
reactor.223  Local government was allowed to engage with the 
reactivation process.224  APC has prepared a plan for the second Tokai 
nuclear power reactor’s reactivation.225  An evacuation plan will be 
prepared for approximately one million people who live within a radius 
of thirty kilometers from the reactor as an Urgent Protective action 
Planning Zone (UPPZ).226  The previous standard required evacuation 
only for up to eight to ten kilometers from the nuclear power reactor as 
an Emergency Planning Zone.227  Expanding the geographic area of an 
UPPZ means more inhabitants and local governments are affected by 
the reactivation process. 
Nuclear power plant operators make reactivation agreements, with 
the local government where the reactor is located and with other local 
 
222. Reviewing the Nuclear Regulation Authority, JAPAN ATOMIC INDUS. 
FORUM, INC. (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.jaif.or.jp/en/reviewing-the-nuclear-
regulation-authority/; see NRA’s Core Values and Principles, NUCLEAR REGULATION 
AGENCY, http://www.nsr.go.jp/english/e_nra/idea.html (Japan) (last visited Mar. 9, 
2020).  
223. Local Consent for Nuclear Plant Restarts, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/04/05/editorials/local-consent-nuclear-
plant-restarts/#.XjPZpS2ZPOQ. 
224. Id.  
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Nuclear Emergency Preparedness: Frequently Asked Questions, CABINET 
OFFICE,   
https://www8.cao.go.jp/genshiryoku_bousai/faq/faq.html (Japan) (last visited Mar. 9, 
2020). 
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governments nearby, regarding various safety measures.228  “The 
agreements stipulate the lines of communication when the plants have 
problems, as well as procedures for prior consent to restarting and 
modifying reactors or building new ones, though they are not legally 
binding.”229  Therefore, the operators still face prospective litigation 
asking for an injunction on operation230 because these agreements with 
nearby local governments are not legally enforceable.  Operators face 
an important challenge: how to maintain the trust of local inhabitants. 
Although a local government has no power to investigate, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Authority does.231  “The NRA is an external bureau 
of the Ministry of the Environment.  The chairman and commissioners 
of the NRA are appointed by the prime minister, with the consent of the 
Diet.”232  The NRA can permit the construction or reactivation of a 
nuclear power reactor.233  In July 2019, eight years after the Great East 
Japan Earthquake occurred, the Tokyo Electric Power Company 
Holdings (TEPCO) finally decided to abolish the second Fukushima 
nuclear power plant.234  TEPCO owes 16 trillion yen in damages to 
compensate victims and 500 billion yen a year to pay for the cost of 
shutting down.235  This case shows the urgent need to grant local 
governments the authority to hold local referendums to investigate and 
regulate matters that affect the local population, such as nuclear power 
plant reactivation.  
 
228. See, e.g., Local Consent for Nuclear Plant Restarts, supra note 223. 
229. Id. 
230. Genpatsu kadō ibaraki hō shiki ashi-gakari ni [(Editorial) Nuclear Power 
Plant Operation Agreement “Ibaraki method” as a Foothold], ASAHI (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.asahi.com/articles/DA3S13433526.html (Japan). 
231. See generally OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, NUCLEAR LEGISLATION 
IN OECD AND NEA COUNTRIES (2017), https://www.oecd-
nea.org/law/legislation/japan.pdf (discussing nuclear legislation and regulation in 
Japan).   
232. Id. at 16. 
233. Id. at 8. 
234. TEPCO Says Will Decommission Fukushima Daini Nuclear Reactor, 
KYODO NEWS (July 24, 2019, 9:31 PM),  
https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2019/07/e344e64406e2-tepco-says-will-
decommission-fukushima-daini-nuclear-reactor.html. 
235. TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, TEPCO INTEGRATED REPORT 2017 
13-14, 53 (2017), https://www7.tepco.co.jp/wp-content/uploads/hd05-02-03-002-
tir2017_01-e.pdf.  
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CONCLUSION 
With the increasing globalization of politics, culture, and the law, 
the scope of sovereignty has narrowed.  Over time, people became 
increasingly indifferent to politics.  Thus, direct democracy may be a 
good method for connecting voters with politics.  Popular sovereignty 
is the principle that authority and power reside with the people.  
Legitimacy is given to representatives who are expected to work for all 
of the people once elected.  Representatives are expected to reflect the 
peoples’ diverse perspectives in the parliament and integrate them into 
the law.  Japanese constitutional studies examine how to assure that the 
people’s diverse voice reaches the parliament and how to allocate the 
parliamentary seats to adequately reflect the people’s vote.  When the 
Japanese Constitution was established, it cemented constituent power 
as the power to amend, meaning it can be activated only when the 
people amend the constitution directly.  However, the Constitution 
provided a few exceptions such as power to amend the constitution and 
power to enact special laws applicable to the local governments.  
Mostly, however, only representatives actively participate in politics. 
Only the Diet possesses law making power.  It is unconstitutional 
to hold legally binding national referendums, but a national referendum 
with no legal binding power may be available at the level of central 
government.  Although people may not consider politics as an 
important part of their daily lives, they should remain vigilant of 
majoritarian abuse over the referendum’s outcome even if it is not 
binding.  If the referendum results in a mistake, a series of constitutional 
defense valves shall be activated to prevent one mistake from leading 
to another.  As a series of legislative actions are taken but fail, the 
judiciary must use a general legal principle in addition to constitutional 
principles.  If the legislature is paralyzed, the judiciary may intervene 
in the political process by holding that legislative inaction is 
unconstitutional.  If the political process fails, the judiciary is 
constitutionally required to check the legislature.  One of the reasons 
for legislative paralysis is due to the role of political parties.  Under the 
current Constitution, the political parties are expected to be the medium 
between voters and the legislature.  By following the political party’s 
decisions, members can perform their jobs as representatives. 
The history of Japanese politics proves that politicians and scholars 
have tried to establish democracy under the previous constitution where 
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the emperor was the sovereign.  The current Constitution has no 
provision specially tailored to regulate political parties’ conduct.  The 
Japanese Constitution may expect political parties to actively connect 
voters with the political process, but if we consider the strong financial 
power backing a political leader, that view may prove too optimistic.  
In order to prevent financial flow directly to a political candidate, 
statutes prescribe how money should pass through the political party.  
To stop political bribery, statutes financially support parties with the 
people’s general taxes.  Still, in a single-seat constituency system, the 
political party leader has the power to officially endorse the candidate 
in the electoral district.  As a result, the representatives usually follow 
the majority political party’s decision and tend to ignore the voters’ 
wishes.  However, as the above-mentioned cases illustrate, the judiciary 
may, under the Constitution, stop the local parliament from unilaterally 
altering decisions.  Therefore, the judiciary shall use the Constitution to 
prevent the parliament from acting unilaterally without considering the 
people’s needs, wishes, or demands. 
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